Threat looming over Kharkiv, battle for Donbas, and Crimean Bridge

The main questions: signs of an offensive on Kharkiv and excessive media coverage of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian facilities

How big is the threat to Kharkiv now? I’d say the aerial threat is constant for Kharkiv. The question here is that the distance from Kharkiv to the [Russian] border is less than 40 kilometers, which enables the enemy to bombard the city remotely. Our air defense simply cannot react in time to missiles flying from Russia’s Belgorod Oblast, because they remain airborne for just about a minute.

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The same applies to guided aerial bombs, which the Russians have been using over Kharkiv for some time, dropping them from aircraft. Launches take place in Russian airspace. At the same time, the military doesn’t currently see the threat of a breakthrough at the border and the Russians’ readiness to advance on Kharkiv or encircle it. Our intelligence has repeatedly said that Russian reports about preparations for an attack on Kharkiv are mostly disinformation and psyops aimed at sowing panic. This is also mentioned in the daily broadcasts of Russian propagandists, where they offer to wipe Kharkiv off the face of the earth and make sure that at least 800,000 people flee the city.

Read also: At least three injured in Russian guided bomb attack on Kharkiv

In fact, their goal is to sow panic, make Kharkiv residents live in constant fear and force them to leave. I visit Kharkiv quite often. I meet with my friends and relatives there, and people have no intention of leaving Kharkiv. Of course, they have anxiety, uncertainty about what will happen tomorrow, but they don’t panic, that’s for sure.

As of now, the [Ukrainian] military doesn’t see the Russians preparing for an offensive on Kharkiv. If these preparations begin, they’ll definitely see it, because the Russians would need a force of at least up to 300,000 troops. They definitely won’t take Kharkiv head-on. We can talk about some large-scale operations to encircle the city, but they simply don’t have enough troops on the northern border now. And the military doesn’t see any signs of preparation for an offensive on Kharkiv.

It’s also difficult to say where the next big battle in Donbas will take place, because the Russians should prepare and pull in a significant group for big battles. More likely, they must fulfill the tasks set by [Russian dictator Vladimir] Putin—reaching the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. In this regard, this task hasn’t been fulfilled.

To capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, they must focus on capturing [the town of] Lyman, which they lost control of in 2022, and the Kramatorsk agglomeration. Given these plans, it’s logical they’re planning strikes on [the town of] Chasiv Yar and Lyman. This is absolutely logical and well-known to our military.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian drone industry is developing rapidly. Designers in various companies are working to increase the reach of our drones. And, as far as I understand, since it’s not possible to fully scale the production of drones as they do in Russia, our designers focus on accuracy. If these reports about the destruction of six warplanes and damage to another eight at the airfield in [Russia’s] Rostov Oblast are true, it means this effort is moving in the right direction.

As for drone strikes on Russian military facilities, it seems to me that excessive coverage and publicity in these operations only harms the cause, because they give the enemy some room for maneuver, to identify either the drone manufacturing company or designers, or, let’s say, the direction of development of certain drones. Therefore, to be honest, I would carefully measure information about who and how launches drones at targets in Russian territory. This is my position.

But I can’t say that I was irritated by The Guardian reporting that Kyrylo Budanov, chief of the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence (HUR), already has everything to destroy Russia’s illegal Crimean Bridge in Kerch and that it will happen this year. I would like to believe HUR has the tools to do so. The only thing is that I have a question, why should we wait until the end of this year?

Read also: Ukraine to destroy Crimean Bridge by mid-2024 — HUR sources

The Crimean Bridge now acts as a supply route for the Russian military in southern Ukraine. But once the railway line from Rostov to Crimea [currently under construction] is operational, it will lose its significance.

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So far, it acts as this logistical military corridor, but then it will simply become a symbol of occupation, a monster built to mark the seizure of a part of Ukrainian territory. Its destruction, if the railway line is built, will be symbolic rather than practical. Therefore, I think that Budanov, if he has an opportunity, shouldn’t wait until the end of the year.

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Read the original article on The New Voice of Ukraine