James Pfister: Alliance aggregation and world order

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The political structure of the world is made up of the relations between and among its 195 nation-states (herein states). These states interact and, therefore, make up a structure. There are 193 members of the United Nations (herein UN). The UN provides for both horizontal and vertical legal structure.

It is natural for human societies to form groups. In international society, these groups vary from informal understandings to full-fledged treaty alliances. Now, that the 30-year era of U.S. unipolarity and relative peace is over, it is useful to speculate about the future structure of alliances that will make up the future world order in the context of the UN system.

James W. Pfister
James W. Pfister

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, warns of the danger from the group of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea (herein the Four) which within a few years will have nearly double the size of our nuclear arsenal. (Robert M. Gates, “The Dysfunctional Superpower,” Foreign Affairs, 9/29/2023). The Four have been pushing back against American dominance and overreach. They are encircled by an expanding NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) to the west and an American structure of security agreements on the east, including Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, as well as certain island states in the western Pacific.

Regarding the Indo-Pacific region, President Biden has recently hosted an historic trilateral meeting with the leaders of Japan and the Philippines, being Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., respectively. Last August, Biden met with the leaders of Japan and South Korea trying to bridge their historical tensions to meet the challenge of China. AUKUS, a group made up of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the U.S., has been cooperating regarding the development of nuclear-powered attack submarines. There has been talk of adding Japan to this group.

With the uncertainty of the China-India relationship, India has joined Australia, Japan, and the U.S. to form the Quad, a group with Chinese aggression in mind. The Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, visited Biden in June, 2023. India has historically had a non-aligned, independent foreign policy beginning with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru with independence in 1947. Whether India will be a dependable ally is uncertain. It continues an established relationship with Russia and is a member of BRICS.

China interprets American groups and alliances as constituting its containment inimical to its interests. In response, China has joined the Four. Much diplomatic interaction occurs among the Four. Potential conflict areas in East Asia include the South China Sea dispute with the Philippines and the control of Taiwan.

Russia, for its part, has become part of the Four in the context of its Ukrainian activities. Iran has sold Russia military equipment, as has North Korea. Russia has developed an economic relationship with China to offset U.S. sanctions; the U.S. has thus failed to isolate Russia. China and Russia are conducting military exercises in potential conflict zones from the Baltics to the western Pacific, enjoying “a perverse symbiosis by weakening the international order from several directions at once.” (Hal Bands, “The New Autocratic Alliances,” Foreign Affairs). The Four have the advantage of geographical proximity around the Eurasian landmass. BRICS is another non-American group, made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. It could be described as a “loose trade alliance” but may become more cohesive over time. Several non-Western states seem to want to join it. (Lynsey Chutel, “BRICS Meeting Attracts Global Interest Not Seen in Years,” The New York Times).

The U.S., NATO, along with alliance structures developed in the Indo-Pacific, the West-plus, will be the major balancer to the Four. The role of the European Union in the balance is uncertain, but only can help in the maintenance of a liberal democratic order. Thus, we can expect the development of two grand alliance structures, one liberal-democratic, the other authoritarian. This balance can provide for order, as long as neither tries to intrude on the other’s internal affairs. International law can develop in the interstices of this balance and of the UN Charter. Both grand alliances will meet in the UN Security Council based on the veto, i.e., consensus, principle. Any Security Council action will constitute vertical world governmental authority.

— James W. Pfister, J.D. University of Toledo, Ph.D. University of Michigan (political science), retired after 46 years in the Political Science Department at Eastern Michigan University. He lives at Devils Lake and can be reached at jpfister@emich.edu.

This article originally appeared on The Holland Sentinel: James Pfister: Alliance aggregation and world order